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Acute Tax Neuroses
Lawrence Bloomenthal*
A CLEVELAND PSYCHIATRIST commented recently that nearly
40% of his male patients were suffering from an increasingly
prevalent ailment-"acute taxitis." Corroborating this diagnosis,
the Wall Street Journal in a front page article cited instances of
physical and emotional disturbances resulting from the struggle
between the taxpayer's conscience and his tax return.
According to the Journal, in Hammond, Indiana a dentist
complained to his accountant that he was plagued by ulcers since
he started cheating on his taxes. In Pittsburgh, a prosperous
business man appeared at the Internal Revenue office to confess
tax evasion because his "guilt. complex" was getting him down.
Business Deduction Mania Complex
While the most serious conflicts arise from attempts at tax-
dodging, there are numerous areas in the tax field where legiti-
mate differences may exist between the taxpayer and the Rev-
enue Service. Deductions for travel and entertainment expenses
have become a more pronounced source of contention since the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in April, 1956, directed
examiners to scrutinize all such items more critically. In Rev-
enue Ruling No. 56-1681 Revenue personnel were instructed to
determine whether any part of the deductions claimed for con-
vention and entertainment expenses, and the cost of meals and
lodging while away from home were personal, and therefore,
non-deductible.
* Of the Ohio and Illinois bars; Graduate of Northwestern University and
Northwestern University Law School, J.D.;
General practice, Chicago, 1931-1936; Tax Counsel, Allen & Company,
Certified Public Accountants, Des Moines, Iowa, 1937-39; U. S. Treasury
Department, Internal Revenue Service, Office of Chief Counsel, Washington,
D. C., 1940-41; Trial Attorney and Assistant Counsel, Office of Chief Coun-
sel, Cleveland, Ohio, 1941-50;
Private practice, tax attorney, since 1950. Accounting faculty, Fenn
College, 1950-1952. Lecturer on taxation at meetings of Cleveland Bar
Association, Cuyahoga County Bar Association and Ohio State Bar Asso-
ciation and to various business, professional and civic groups. Contributor
of articles to "Taxes," Cleveland Bar Journal and other publications. Mem-
ber of Cleveland Tax Club; Tax Section, American Bar Association; Cleve-
land, Cuyahoga and Ohio Bar Associations; and American Bar Association.
1 Revenue Ruling No. 56-168, I. R. B. 1956-17, 6; CCH Rewrite Bulletin,
10,896, April 18, 1956. See also, Taxes Are Taxing, 3 Med. News (19) 1
(Nov. 11, 1957).
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Taxpayers who have been in the habit of claiming lump-sum
deductions for meetings and conventions will now be called upon
to furnish substantiating evidence and explanations far more
frequently than in the past. Commingling of family vacations
and business trips also is being attacked.
Let us assume that Joe Taxpayer decides to attend an in-
dustry convention scheduled for Christmas week in Los Angeles.
Taking advantage of the family-plan fares, he arranges for his
wife to accompany him and instructs the bookkeeper to charge
the entire bill to travel expense. Later, when questioned by a
Revenue Agent, he insists that as a company officer, all of his own
expenses are fully deductible. Since special functions had been
planned for executives' wives, he took it for granted that her
expenses were deductible also. Citing Revenue Ruling No. 56-168,
the Agent disagrees and proposes disallowance of one-half of
Joe's expenses as a vacation trip and all the plane fare, hotel
bills and other costs of taking his wife along.
A deduction for Joe's reasonable expenses directly incidental
to the convention is conceded by the Agent, especially since Joe
produces receipts and cancelled checks for major expenses and
can give some proof of minor expenses. However, when he claims
that his wife actively participates in the business because she
occasionally works as a receptionist and bookkeeper, the ex-
aminer points out that it is neither necessary nor customary for
employees in these categories to attend a trade convention at
company expense.2
On the vacation issue, Joe admits that departure from and
return to his home city did not coincide with the opening and
closing dates of the convention, plus necessary travel, time. Never-
theless, he defends the entire trip as having a sound business
purpose. Pointing out that competitors had built new plants in
various sections of the country, especially in and around Cali-
fornia, Oregon and the Southwestern states, he insists that a tour
of inspection throughout the area was of immense benefit to the
company. While conceding that there could be merit in this
argument, a review of hotel bills and charge slips for gasoline,
etc. sent into the company, convinces the Agent that approxi-
mately half of Joe's time was spent in Yellowstone Park and
other vacation spots. Accordingly, he refuses to change his
2 Internal Revenue Service Publication No. 300, "Deductions For Traveling
and Transportation Expenses," April 10, 1956; Vol. 565 CCH Standard Fed-
eral Tax Reports, 6347, p. 52,195.
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original determination based on the Commissioner's ruling that
post-convention expenses for a round-about return trip to take in
interesting sights are no longer regarded as part of the conven-
tion expense.
Disallowances also will be made if a post-convention cruise
has been included in the travel costs, since Revenue Ruling No.
56-168 comments:
* * * a post-convention cruise made available to individuals
attending the convention, the purpose of which is primarily
recreational although some incidental sessions are scheduled
for lectures, discussions or exhibitions related to the business
interests of the group holding the convention, the expenses
paid for the local sightseeing, entertaining and visiting and
the entire cost of the post-convention cruise are deemed to
represent non-deductible personal expenses. (Italics sup-
plied.)
Proper records of the nature and amount of entertainment
expenses, whether incurred at home or while traveling, will go
a long way in alleviating tensions between the Revenue Ex-
aminer and the taxpayer. This was shown in the recent case of
George A. Jacquemat,3 where a salesman made it a habit to keep
diaries in which he listed the names, places and amounts of en-
tertainment items. When the Commissioner disallowed approxi-
mately 25% of the total claimed in each of two years, he appealed
to the Tax Court, relying upon his diaries and his own supporting
testimony. By this means, substantially all of the claim was
allowed.
In the case of professional men, such as doctors, lawyers or
accountants, some examiners have questioned entertainment ex-
penses which are not directly related to present clients or ac-
counts. Businessmen, it is assumed, entertain primarily in order
to attract new customers, since they are free to solicit orders in
a highly competitive market. But professional men are re-
strained by certain ethical standards from so actively pursuing
prospective clients or patients. Also, entertainment aimed at
promoting future business would be unethical. However, the
majority of decided cases affirm the right of professional people
to deduct reasonable amounts as legitimate business expenses.
Fraternal organization and country club dues, greens fees, dining
room charges, etc., are deductible to the extent that they bear a
3 Geo. A. Jacquemat, 15 TCM 1045 (8/28/56). Cases on the deductibility
and allocation of automobile expenses are collected and discussed in Vol-
ume 571 CCH Standard Federal Tax Service, 1354 and 1 1360.02.
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direct and proximate relationship to the conduct of a professional
practice. Of course, if the taxpayer's family also uses country
club facilities, a proportionate part of the dues and charges must
be eliminated from business entertainment and treated as per-
sonal expenses.
Revenue agents have become increasingly critical also of
automobile expense deductions claimed by individuals. Under
today's more stringent policy, 100% of the expense for the use
of an individually owned automobile is rarely allowable. Usually,
10% or more is allocated to personal use, depending on the cir-
cumstances.
Professional Taxitis
Since lawyers, doctors, dentists and other personal service
people are dependent primarily on their ability to work con-
tinuously, they have contended that they are entitled to deduct
the cost of protecting their income to the same extent as pre-
miums on fire, theft and burglary insurance. Their reasoning
has been that the cost of replacing income lost through accidental
or physical disability is an essential part of their business over-
head. Unfortunately, the Tax Court and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue both disagree.
In the Blaess case 4 it was decided that a doctor cannot deduct
disability insurance premiums as an income-protection expense,
although they may be included as medical expenses if deductions
are properly itemized. The practical effect of this decision is to
deny any deduction at all in most instances, due to the limitations
on deductible medical expenses.5
4 Marvin J. Blaess, 28 T. C. No. 78 (6/25/57). Judge Harron distinguished
disability income protection insurance premiums from cost of overhead ex-
pense reimbursement policy for which the premiums were held deductible
in Revenue Ruling No. 55-264, C. B. 1955-1, p. 11.
5 (a) Accident and health insurance premiums must be allocated between
coverage for loss of earnings (disability) and reimbursement for medical
expenses. Commissioner's position is that only the latter portion of pre-
miums is includible in medical expenses: Revenue Ruling 55-261, C. B.
1955-1, 307.
Limitations on amounts deductible as medical expenses are specified
in Sections 213 (b), (c) and (d) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See
also discussion in Vol. 572 CCH Standard Federal Tax Service, 2019, p.
23,049.
(b) Post-graduate training course expenses. Lawyer's expenses for at-
tending N. Y. University Institute on Federal Taxation deductible due to
necessity to keep up in current work with changing status of the law.
Coughlin v. Comm'r., 203 F. 2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953), 53-1 U. S. T. C. 9321.
(Continued on next page)
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Along the same line, there is another troublesome item-that
of deducting the cost of post-graduate education. One of the
strange inequities of the present tax law is that investments in
new machinery and equipment are recoverable through depre-
ciation, but no extra tax benefits are available to professional men
to amortize the cost of their specialized training. Instead, any
amounts expended for post-graduate courses are 'considered per-
sonal items intended to enhance one's prestige and future earn-
ing power. The only exception is where advanced training is
required to maintain an existing position so that it is an income-
producing expense. A legitimate means of circumventing this
rule appears to be the combination of advanced seminars and
clinics with professional conventions. Fees for refresher courses
or technical demonstrations of new developments are included
in the over-all convention charge and the entire amount is
treated as convention expense.
Tax Evasion Delirium Tremens
The major cause of acute taxitis is the mental and physical
turmoil arising from accusations by the Revenue Service that
false and fraudulent returns have been filed with intent to evade
taxes. The three most common means by which tax evasion is
discovered are: (1) routine audit-spot checks and surveys;
(2) tips from informers in hopes of receiving sizeable rewards,
or by jealous neighbors or disgruntled employees; (3) newspaper
publicity about marriages, trips, home purchases, robberies, real
estate and business transactions.
Whatever the source, either one or two Agents will begin a
thorough check. The more serious cases are handled on a joint
basis by a Revenue Agent from the Audit Division and a Special
Agent from the Intelligence Division.
The recent case of United States v. Doyle,6 is typical of the
manner in which evidence for a tax fraud prosecution is de-
veloped. While Mr. Doyle happened to be involved in some illegal
(Continued from preceding page)
(c) Doctor's expenses for post-graduate courses not deductible. 1921
0. D. 984, 5 C. B. 171. But, Coughlin decision (supra) probably justifies
deduction of expenses for courses taken to maintain existing practice of
physicians.
(d) Teacher's expenses for courses necessary to qualify for renewal of
certificate are deductible. Hill v. Comm'r., 181 F. 2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), 50-1
U. S. T. C. 9310.
6 234 F. 2d 788 (7th Cir. 1956); for the unreported decision of the District
Court, see 56-1 U. S. T. C. 9553.
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ventures, the procedure employed by the Government was the
same as in the case of any businessman suspected of fraud.
After careful checking of all known facts, the Agents de-
termined that Doyle had underestimated his income in one year
by approximately $27,000 and by about $31,000 in the next year.
The technique by which these figures were arrived at demon-
strates the meticulous thoroughness of a tax-fraud investigation.
The Agents received no cooperation at any time from the tax-
payer, who claimed that all his underlying books of original
entry, cancelled checks and bank statements for past years had
been burned before the examination began. Moreover, he refused
flatly to furnish a net worth statement, even though the Agents
offered to show him the Government's accounting information.
His only concessions were an oral estimate of living expenses
and the turning over of summary sheets showing total receipts
and disbursements for the two-year period under investigation.
To build up the prosecution, Agents checked each deposit in
every bank account and prepared schedules showing which of the
deposited items were cash and which were checks. All disburse-
ments were investigated and all entries in the summary sheets
furnished by the taxpayer were traced.
The next step was to canvass all department stores in the
entire area between Gary, Indiana, East Chicago and Chicago,
for charge accounts in the name of Doyle or any member of his
family. All public records were scrutinized for mortgages, real
estate transactions, law suits and any recorded transactions to
which he might have been a party. The Agents spent from 1951
to 1954 investigating, comparing and analyzing their findings.
Finally, an indictment was returned and Doyle was brought to
trial in January of 1955. The trial lasted eighteen days, with
extremely complicated accounting testimony introduced by both
sides. Doyle was convicted and sentenced to two years in federal
prison, plus paying the maximum fine of $10,000. In addition, he
was liable for substantial back taxes and 50% fraud penalties.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the conviction was upheld.7
The investigative powers of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue have been held to be similar to those of a Grand Jury.8
Also, his authority to redetermine income by use of the "net
7 Doyle v. U. S., supra, n. 6.
8 Falsone v. U. S., 205 F. 2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), 53-2 U. S. T. C. 9367, affg.
unreported order of District Court; cert. den., 346 U. S. 864, 74 S. Ct. 103
(1953).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss1/14
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
worth" method, regardless of the taxpayer's business being legal
or illegal, has been upheld by the Supreme Court. At the same
time, the Court has imposed limitations on the net worth method
which furnish the taxpayer with definite advantagesY The bur-
den of proof always is on the Commissioner to show wilfulness
and a deliberate intent to defraud. To prove fraud, there must
be either direct proof of specific items of income knowingly
omitted, or there must be surrounding circumstances showing
fraudulent intent. Increase in net wealth beyond reported tax-
able income has been held to be circumstantial evidence of intent
to defraud. 10
Originally, the net worth method was employed in checking
illegal business enterprises which made a practice of keeping no
books. However, in the Holland case," the Supreme Court ruled
that the character of the business, whether legitimate or other-
wise, had no bearing on the Government's right to use this
method. Moreover, the fact that the taxpayer's books appear to
be adequate does not preclude the use of the net worth approach.
However, one of the limitations imposed in the Holland case
is that opening net worth must be established with a substantial
degree of reliability. Independent corroboration must be pro-
duced by the Government in order to demonstrate that expendi-
tures for personal and family expenses, together with invest-
ments in new assets during the years under investigation, orig-
inated in unreported income rather than from prior accumulated
wealth.' 2
For example, in the Imburgia case, 13 the taxpayer claimed a
large amount of opening cash on hand, but the Government's
case showed a prior history of low earnings, together with the
absence of any gifts or inheritances; and the existence of loans
was carefully negatived. Accordingly, the Tax Court ruled that
the Government had carried its burden of proof in establishing
opening net worth with a sufficient degree of certainty.
In the Ford case,'1 4 it was shown that the living standard of
9 Holland v. U. S., 348 U. S. 121, 75 S. Ct. 127 (1954), affirming conviction
based on net worth theory.
10 Holland, supra; Daniel Smith v. U. S., 348 U. S. 147, 75 S. Ct. 194 (1954);
U. S. v. Calderon, 348 U. S. 160, 75 S. Ct. 186 (1954).
11 Holland v. U. S., supra, n. 9.
12 Calderon and Smith decisions, supra, n. 10, deal with corroboration of
opening cash and other elements of the net worth statement.
13 Frank Imburgia, 22 T. C. 1002; Acq. 1955-4, 6.
14 U. S. v. Ford (2d Cir. 1956) affg. unreported decision of District Court,
New York. Certiorari granted on 2/24/57.
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a policeman combined with his savings during the taxable period
was far in excess of anything that could have been achieved on
his salary. His explanation that such extra funds came from
certain vague sources was thoroughly discredited.
Claims of inheritances from relatives in foreign countries
often are used as an explanation of undeposited cash on hand
at the opening of the investigation period. This defense is dif-
ficult for the Commissioner to overcome because of the inacces-
sibility of contradictory proof. Yet, the courts seem to view such
stories skeptically, as in the case of Schwartzkopf v. Commis-
sioner.15
The taxpayer claimed he had $300,000 of opening cash on
hand on December 31, 1945. He contended that a good part of
this sum had been inherited from an uncle who died in a part of
Europe now occupied by Russia. Documentary proof of the
uncle's death and the inheritance were not produced on the
ground that these records had been destroyed during World
War II. The only evidence of the inheritance were notations
on the taxpayer's passport of amounts allegedly brought back
from Europe by him. The Tax Court rejected the story.
All of the circumstances in the case, according to the Tax
Court, pointed to a deliberate fraud. Analysis of Schwartzkopf's
net worth increase showed that real estate holdings, bank ac-
counts, investments in securities and other assets had increased
from approximately $71,000 in January of 1946 to $335,000 by the
end of 1951. Exhaustive investigation brought out the fact that
Schwartzkopf had no liabilities during this period.
Other defenses also rejected were that he was a bad book-
keeper, poor mathematician and a very busy eye specialist.
However, the Court points out that Dr. Schwartzkopf had found
time to prepare his own tax returns, that he had kept a receipt
book in his own handwriting, and once a month, entered net re-
ceipts from the operation of his private hospital. On appeal, the
Tax Court was affirmed.
To corroborate unreported income shown by net worth in-
creases, the Commissioner frequently relies on unexplained bank
deposits on the theory that they represent omitted income. Here
again, the Commissioner must be prepared to show that these
deposits did not come from cash on hand accumulated from prior
savings, gifts or inheritances.
15 15 T. C. M. 762, T. C. Memo 1956-155, affd. 57-2 U. S. T. C. 1 9816 (3rd
Cir. 1957).
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Occupational Neuroses
In the case of Dr. Henry Minor,16 bank deposits during the
years 1943 to 1948 exceeded gross receipts reported for the same
period by about $111,250. A net worth statement prepared by the
taxpayer's own certified public accountant also showed increases
in wealth exceeding reported net income, even though such
increases were less than those shown by the Revenue Agents.
The Tax Court did not accept the figures of either side. Instead,
it made an independent finding based on evidence. According
to its conclusion, approximately one-half of the $48,000 in addi-
tional taxes determined by the Commissioner were sustained,
plus 50% fraud penalties.
Another method of proving the existence of unreported in-
come is by comparing net worth increases with the results ob-
tained by adding back specific items known to have been omitted
from income. In Commissioner v. Stern,17 the taxpayer, a promi-
nent ophthalmologist, had reported amounts varying between
$13,000 and $19,000 during the years 1943 to 1947. He maintained
individual record cards for each patient, setting forth details of
treatment and payments received. Also, he kept a day book
showing the amounts allegedly collected from each patient. To-
tals were used as gross receipts in his tax returns.
Upon investigation, Dr. Stern's records were found to con-
tain many errors, alterations and obliterations. The examiners,
however, discovered the existence of a code showing the actual
amounts collected. Because of the suspicious condition of the
records, they were submitted to the Alcohol Tax Unit for chemi-
cal tests, where it was ascertained that ink eradicator had been
used to change entries. Patients of the doctor were contacted
and interviewed. Over 10,000 record cards were scrutinized and
tabulated in schedules showing gross receipts on a specific items
basis.
A novel defense by Dr. Stern's attorney was that the Gov-
ernment should have used the net worth method, whereby a
smaller amount of omitted income would have been shown. The
Tax Court held that the Commissioner was not obliged to use
the net worth method since there were actual records available
for the Government to inspect.
From the cases discussed, it is apparent that opening cash
16 Dr. Henry W. Minor, 15 T. C. M. 906, T. C. Memo 1956-175.
17 14 T. C. M. 140, T. C. Memo 1955-40.
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on hand is one of the most important, yet most elusive, factors
in setting up a net worth statement. Without a reasonably ac-
curate starting figure for opening cash, the rest of the net worth
statement is meaningless. Consequently, the Commissioner has
no right to make any arbitrary assumptions that opening and
closing cash are the same.
This rule was clearly established by a recent decision of the
5th Circuit Court of Appeals in the Estate of Phillips.'8 Here, the
only question was whether either side had produced adequate
proof of cash on hand as of January 1, 1947, the opening date of
the net worth statement. The Commissioner had used $4,500 for
both opening and closing cash on hand and argued that his find-
ings were presumptively correct. It was contended that the
burden was on the taxpayer to disprove the accuracy of the
Commissioner's findings.
The Tax Court agreed, holding that it was up to the tax-
payer to prove error. Upon appeal, however, the Appellate Court
reversed this decision. In its opinion, the Court stated:
The presumption which favors the determination of the Com-
missioner is not to be regarded as meaning that any arbitrary
figure assigned to the cash on hand account without support
in the record must nonetheless be treated as conclusive in
the absence of an affirmative showing by the taxpayer of
the correct amount.
The Phillips decision is significant in holding that the tax-
payer need only show from all the surrounding circumstances
that the opening cash figure used by the Commissioner is ob-
viously erroneous. He need not go further and establish the
amount which he claims is correct.
Corroboration of opening cash figures in the Government's
net worth surveys can come from various sources. Proof by the
Government of an intentional exaggeration of deductions or ex-
penses during the current years can be used to overcome the
alleged existence of more opening cash than the Commissioner
has allowed. In United States v. Eggleston,' 9 a second-hand car
dealer in Louisville, Kentucky, was convicted of tax fraud and
his conviction was sustained on appeal. Costs of used cars were
found to be overstated by approximately $19,000 in one year,
18 Est. of Phillips (5th Cir. 1957), revg. and remanding Tax Court decision,
14 T. C. M. 516, T. C. Memo 1955-139.
19 227 F. 2d 493 (6th Cir. 1956), affg. unreported decision of District Court;
cert. den., 352 U. S. 826, 77 S. Ct. 38.
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and the cost of repairs to make them saleable was exaggerated
by $9,600. Net worth increases supported this finding.
The taxpayer's defense was that used cars were scarce and
that he was forced to pay an additional "bird dog" fee of from
$25 to $50 cash per car to persons locating cars for him. When
pressed for dates, names and addresses of informants, he was
unable to give any information. By checking automobile title
records, the agents ascertained the names of all persons from
whom Eggleston had purchased cars and interviewed them. The
new owners were then interviewed to find the price at which
the cars had been sold to them. Comparison of these findings
with the taxpayer's books was a simple matter.
Although the taxpayer may admit that he cannot account
for large net worth increases by reasons of prior cash accumula-
tion from gifts, loans or inheritances, the government still must
track down every lead which might account for unreported in-
come. In the Epstein case,20 the taxpayer had two businesses
which the agents considered the most likely sources of unex-
plained funds. However, Epstein insisted that he had at least
$168,000 opening cash on hand. His defense was that the Agents
had not discovered any specific false entries in his books, and
that therefore, the Commissioner and the Court were duty bound
to accept his version of the opening cash.
The Special Agent, however, testified that the $20,000 cash on
hand allowed in the Government's net worth statement was based
not only on his own calculations, but upon Epstein's statements
furnished to Dun & Bradstreet and to the Union Planter's Bank.
At the trial, defendant's counsel moved for exclusion of
statements given to Dun & Bradstreet and also of the signed
statement given the bank, on the ground that these were "extra-
judicial statements" which had to be corroborated by inde-
pendent evidence. Both the trial court and the 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that this evidence did not
constitute declarations against interest and that they were not
similar in any way to "confessions" or statements given to police
authorities during a criminal investigation. Only the latter type
of admission requires corroboration.
In Epstein's case, the statements were voluntary declarations
made for his own benefit long before any tax investigation was
begun. According to the Court, " * * a man's own acts, conduct
20 Epstein v. U. S., 246 F. 2d 563 (6th Cir. 1957) affg. an unreported District
Court decision.
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and declarations, which are voluntary, are always admissible in
evidence against him without independent corroboration."
Self-Medication
Tax problems have progressed to the ulcer-producing state
when an apparently routine audit shows signs of turning into a
full-fledged investigation of criminal tax evasion. At this point,
the taxpayer and his representatives must decide whether, when,
and to what extent defenses based on the privilege against self-
incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures should be
raised.
Since abolition of the rule granting immunity for a timely
voluntary disclosure, the basic question is: How far should
taxpayers cooperate? In the case of corporate officers, there is
little choice. Testimony or documents may not be withheld on
the ground that the corporation would be incriminated.2 ' More-
over, according to United States Supreme Court rulings, cor-
porate books and records cannot be kept from Government of-
ficials on the ground that the officer producing them might be
incriminated by their contents. While a corporate officer cannot
be forced to reveal the whereabouts of missing books, he is
subject to fine and imprisonment for disobedience of the subpoena
ordering their production. 22
In the case of individual taxpayers, if requested informally
by a Special Agent to produce records or appear at a hearing in
the office of the Intelligence Division, should they refuse? While
voluntary appearance is not compulsory, failure to comply or to
produce records can lead to the issuance of a summons under
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code. Enforcement of the
summons by contempt proceedings in the U. S. District Court is
provided for in Section 7604 (b) (4).
Voluntary appearance usually is advisable, since the tax-
payer does not thereby automatically waive any Constitutional
privileges. By citing his privilege against self-incrimination, he
still may refuse to answer questions tending to jeopardize him.
Taxpayers can be compelled to produce personal records before
a Revenue official if they are in their possession, but cannot be
compelled to discuss their contents if a proper and timely claim
of privilege has been made.
However, non-cooperation presents a curious dilemma. While
21 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370 (1906).
22 Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 31 S. Ct. 538 (1910); Curcio v. U. S., 77
S. Ct. 1145 (1957).
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the taxpayer's refusal to cooperate because of reliance upon the
Fifth Amendment cannot be mentioned by Government wit-
nesses, yet, in United States v. Croessant,23 and in the more re-
cent case of United States v. Long,24 it was made clear that such
unwillingness can be brought to the attention of the trial jury.
In the Long case, the examiner handling the investigation tes-
tified that the taxpayer at no time explained how he arrived at
the figures shown on his tax return, nor did he make available
any books or records to assist the Revenue Service. After con-
viction, counsel for the defense moved for a new trial on the
ground that it was prejudicial error for the Court to permit
evidence that the defendant had relied upon the Fifth Amend-
ment. The record showed, however, that there was no direct
reference by the government witnesses to the Fifth Amendment.
Overruling the argument that testimony of non-cooperation
was an indirect circumvention of the rule against reference to
the Fifth Amendment, the Court stated:
* * * Recognizing that the taxpayer's conduct during the
investigation by revenue agents and his failure to keep
books and records are cogent evidence of his wilfulness, and
that the filing of false returns is sufficient, of itself, to show
wilfulness, the element of wilfulness is not wanting.
Consequently, each case calls for an exercise of judgment to
balance the advantages of Constitutional privilege against pos-
sible disadvantages of non-cooperation.
Familial Psychosis
In conclusion, mention should be made of a grimly amusing
domestic drama, United States v. Ashby.25 Bert Ashby, a prac-
ticing Texas attorney, separated from his wife in 1954. She then
sued for divorce. While the suit was pending, Mrs. Ashby volun-
23 U. S. v. Croessant, 178 F. 2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1949).
24 U. S. v. Long (W. D. Pa. 1957). Numerous cases deal with dangers of
voluntary statements. Courts appear to be reluctant about ready acceptance
of claims that statements were obtained by Revenue Agents through illegal
coercion, entrapment, misrepresentation of misleading promises of immu-
nity. See: U. S. v. Eitingin, 57-2 U. S. T. C. [ 9863, for interesting discussion
of alleged deception and failure to advise as to Constitutional rights; Biggs
v. U. S. (6th Cir. 1957), affg. unreported District Court decision, 57-2 U. S.
T. C. f1 9809, in which the Court of Appeals found that surrender of books
was voluntary and not induced by threats, fraudulent misrepresentations
or misleading promises of immunity; In the Matter of Russo (2d Cir. 1957),
57-1 U. S. T. C. 9395, affg. unreported decision of the District Court (no
evidence to support claim that agents deceived taxpayer into believing that
examination was for a routine civil audit and not connected with any
criminal charge).
25 U. S. v. Ashby (5th Cir. 1957), 57-2 U. S. T. C. 11 9743.
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1958
TAX NEUROSES
tarily turned over to the Revenue Service the business records
of her husband without his knowledge or consent.
Shortly after the divorce was granted, Ashby was indicted
for failure to make income tax returns for the years 1952-53. He
moved for dismissal of the indictment, for suppression of the
records and papers obtained from his wife as evidence, and for
the return to him of all of these documents. A hearing was held
by the District Court, at which both Ashby and the Government
offered testimony. The Government contended that Mrs. Ashby's
motive in bringing the records to the Revenue Service was to
ascertain her own tax status; Ashby claimed her conduct was
prompted by a desire to injure him.
Ashby's motion was granted in full; the District Court's
finding was that his ex-wife had been motivated by anger and
malice, rather than to obtain information about her own lia-
bility. Consequently, the evidence obtained was held to be illegal
and inadmissible and the indictment was ordered quashed and
dismissed.
Upon appeal to the 5th Circuit, the judgment of the District
Court was reversed. After passing on a technical question of
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals considered the taxpaper's ar-
guments. These were: the disqualification of one spouse to
testify against the other at common law and under the Texas
statutes, violation of search and seizure provisions of the Fourth
Amendment, and the self-incrimination provisions of the Fifth
Amendment.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that Mrs. Ashby had re-
fused to testify at the preliminary hearing at the District Court
and that it did not appear likely that she would testify against
her ex-spouse. All she had done was to make available to the
agents records showing or indicating the possibility of a com-
munity tax liability of her husband and herself. These records
were not a communication between husband and wife, and in no
sense confidential as between themselves.
On the question of illegal search and seizure and self-
incrimination, the Court noted that Government officials had no
part in wrongfully taking away Ashby's records. Since an in-
dividual unconnected with the Government had placed them in
the Government's possession, they could be used both as a basis
for indictment by a Grand Jury and as part of the evidence at the
trial. Moral: "Hell Hath No Fury Like A Woman Scorned."
(Shakespeare)
And the tax neuroses multiply.
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